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Strategic Learning and its Limits$
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H. Peyton Young

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199269181

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269181.001.0001

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(p.144) 9 Conclusion
Strategic Learning and its Limits

H. Peyton Young

Oxford University Press

This chapter summarizes the preceding discussions and shows how the results extend to situations involving strategic agents interacting with each other as well as with their external environment. These lectures examined the problem of interactive learning in the context of repeated games, where it is very starkly defined. In fact, interactive learning is a feature of almost all economic and social systems, where the intentions of the learners are at least part of what needs to be learned. Many of the results discussed in the preceding chapters extend readily to a wider class of situations in which players interact with each other as well as with their external environment.

Keywords:   interactive learning, games, external environment, social system, players

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