Reframing Corporate Governance: Behavioral Assumptions, Governance Mechanisms, and Institutional Dynamics
This introductory chapter outlines the features of the new approach to CG that can be built by integrating the insights from the different contributions gathered in the book. Further specific theses advanced in this chapter are that the ‘shareholder view’ and the unabashed recommendation of pay for performance misapply agency and property right theories themselves; that CG design should be grounded in an empirically-based appreciation of preferences and motivation; that the portfolio of governance mechanisms should be enlarged to include organizational mechanisms such as negotiation, social control, and community governance; and that, contrary to common wisdom, an economic and organizational efficiency view of CG should lead to differentiated rather than homogeneous solutions, while institutional isomorphism and legitimacy may lead to inefficient convergence.
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