Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically-Based Analysis of Capital Providers' Preferences and Superior Governance Structures
Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically-Based Analysis of Capital Providers' Preferences and Superior Governance Structures
This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It uses an analytical framework and an empirical study conducted in Italy, which gathers empirically the actual preferences of two samples, representative of the providers of financial and human capital, over varying policies on a variety of governance and organizational mechanisms (e.g., low to high pay for performance; low to high teamwork; low to high managerial representation in boards etc.). Preferences are cluster-analyzed and compared with actually implemented policies. Results indicate that actors' preferences converge more than conventionally expected, while they differ sharply from actually implemented policies, thereby indicating opportunities for the Pareto-improvement of CG structures.
Keywords: agency theory, multiple principals, governance mechanisms, human capital, preferences, Italian firms
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