Evaluations of Rationality
Evaluations of Rationality
This chapter works from the guiding idea that rationality is the excellence of a rational agent qua rational, and goes on to defend a neo-Humean conception of evaluations of theoretical and practical rationality, according to which such evaluations make essential reference to an agent's ends or goals in assessing the rationality of the agent's beliefs, actions, and intentions. Evaluations of theoretical and practical rationality differ according to the types of goals relative to which we make evaluations of rationality. This view is defended appealing to intuitions about irrationality with respect to particular cases, which are best explained by the neo-Humean; a defence which is neutral with regard to metaphysical issues about the nature of reasons. This defence is admittedly partial because it does not fully address questions about the justificatory force of rationality evaluations, leaving important tasks for the neo-Humean to tackle.
Keywords: practical rationality, theoretical rationality, Hume, evaluations of rationality, rational agent, beliefs, actions, intentions, intuitions
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
