Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Democratic DriftMajoritarian Modification and Democratic Anomie in the United Kingdom$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Matthew Flinders

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199271597

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271597.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 October 2021

V9. Judicial Review

V9. Judicial Review

(p.238) Chapter 13 V9. Judicial Review
Democratic Drift

Matthew Flinders (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The logic of legal constitutionalism promotes the role of judges as external regulators of political behaviour. It therefore seeks to increase the degree of constitutional rigidity by seeking to locate some basic rights, values, or principles beyond the reach of elected politicians. New Labour sought to embrace elements of legal constitutionalism while maintaining a ‘political constitution’. The outcome is a confused and anomalous element of the broader bi‐constitutionality argument.

Keywords:   judicial review, anti‐majoritarian institutions, supreme court, judicial politics, bi‐constitutionality, constitutional reform, Judicial Appointments Commission, New Labour, executive veto capacity, declaration of incompatibility

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .