Succession and Simultaneity: Causation in the Analogies
Succession and Simultaneity: Causation in the Analogies
This chapter talks about the problem of the Second Analogy—it rests on the observation that our experience is temporarily discursive, or as Kant repeatedly stresses ‘as the subjective succession of apprehension’. The crucial observation is that such a subjective succession can be the manifestation of objective states of affairs having quite different temporal structures. An experience of objective successiveness is correlative to a general entitlement to draw conclusions about something preceding and necessitating whatever is perceived as happening or occurring. Kant's own account precisely inverts the Humean order of dependency. A commitment to the universal validity of the principle of causation is a condition of possible experience, including the experiences of objective temporal successiveness, the happenings and occurrences, that Hume's account simple takes for granted.
Keywords: Second Analogy, succession of apprehension, temporal structures, Hume, causation, fundamental conception
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