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Accessing KantA relaxed introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason$
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Jay F. Rosenberg

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199275816

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275816.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 06 March 2021

Perceptual Synthesis: From Sensations to Objects

Perceptual Synthesis: From Sensations to Objects

Chapter:
(p.108) 5 Perceptual Synthesis: From Sensations to Objects
Source:
Accessing Kant
Author(s):

Jay F. Rosenberg

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275816.003.0006

In this chapter, what Kant is saying is that there is one generic concept of an object of which all our empirical object-concepts, i.e. concepts of particular kinds of objects (books, houses, trees, pencil, etc.), are specifications. When we abstract from the specific differences of our concepts of kinds of objects, we also abstract from all determinate sensory content and perspectival orientation. Kant can be represented as arguing that this most fundamental sort of perceptual synthesis is a condition of the possibility of the unity of apperceptive consciousness in the experiencing subject. Kant's thesis is a significantly stronger one, namely, that this sort of perceptual synthesis is the condition of the possibility of the transcendental unity of apperception. Apperception, in contrast, ‘applies to all sensible intuition of objects in general, to the manifold of intuitions in general’. That is, the synthetic unity of apperception necessarily characterizes both outer and inner experiences.

Keywords:   empirical object-concepts, perpectival orientation, Transcendental Deduction, Analytic of Principles, Refutation of Idealism

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