No Place for the A Priori *
No Place for the A Priori *
This chapter argues that all knowledge is empirical. It attempts to undermine the motivation for the a priori that comes from examples in mathematics, philosophy, and logic. In particular, it argues that logic can be seen as empirical if rule-circular arguments are allowed. And a priorists cannot disallow such arguments because any justification of a priori reasoning would have to be rule-circular. The chapter argues that the whole idea of the a priori is unexplained and deeply obscure. Traditional attempts at explanation that appeal to analyticity fail in two ways. They rest on an unexplained acceptance of logical truths and on the mistaken view that competence with a concept is sufficient for knowledge about it. A consideration of the contemporary views of Peacocke, Bealer, and BonJour helps to bring out the obscurity.
Keywords: a priori, empirical, mathematics, philosophy, logic, rule-circularity, concepts, Peacocke, Bealer, BonJour
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
