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TruthmakersThe Contemporary Debate$
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Helen Beebee and Julian Dodd

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199283569

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 December 2021

Realism beyond Correspondence

Realism beyond Correspondence

Chapter:
(p.49) 4 Realism beyond Correspondence
Source:
Truthmakers
Author(s):

Michael Morris

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0004

This chapter questions the view that correspondence theories of truth are a paradigm of realism, and raises the possibility of a non-correspondence account that is more thoroughly realist. The problem is that correspondence theories require an isomorphism between truth-bearers and the world, which is too neat to be easily motivated from a realist point of view: the world has to have a kind of propositional structure, which is hard to understand as anything other than a projection of the structure of sentences. It is then argued that a non-correspondence realism is preferable to an idealism that continues to accept the correspondence theory. The chapter ends by attempting to defend the claim that it is possible to describe the world as it is in itself, even if the world is not in itself propositional.

Keywords:   truth, correspondence theory, idealism, truth-bearers, propositional structure, non-correspondence realism, isomorphism, structure of sentences

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