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Content, Cognition, and CommunicationPhilosophical Papers II$
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Nathan Salmon

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284726

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001

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A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn (1990) *

A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn (1990) *

(p.3) 1 A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn (1990)*
Content, Cognition, and Communication

Nathan Salmon (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that in sharp contrast to established opinion, the linguistic evidence arising out of propositional-attitude attributions strongly supports Millianism (the doctrine that the entire contribution to the proposition content of a sentence made by a proper name is simply the name's referent) without providing the slightest counter-evidence. This claim is supported through a semantic analysis of such de re attributions as ‘Jones believes of Venus that it is a star’. The apparent failure of subtitutivity of co-referential proper names in propositional-attitude attributions is shown to be evidentially irrelevant through consideration of analogous phenomena involving straightforward synonyms.

Keywords:   Millianism, name, proposition, substitution, synonymy

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