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Content, Cognition, and CommunicationPhilosophical Papers II$
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Nathan Salmon

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284726

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001

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The Pragmatic Fallacy (1991) *

The Pragmatic Fallacy (1991) *

(p.298) 17 The Pragmatic Fallacy (1991)*
Content, Cognition, and Communication

Nathan Salmon (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter exposes a fallacy commonly committed in arguments concerning the philosophy of semantics. The Pragmatic Fallacy consists in inferring a semantic property of an expression from the illocutionary act that a speaker accomplishes in using the expression, e.g., ‘A asserts p is uttering S in context c; therefore S semantically expresses p with respect to c’. Wettstein's argument for semantic significance of Donnellan's referential-attributive distinction is analyzed as committing the Pragmatic Fallacy.

Keywords:   assertion, attributive, Donnellan, pragmatic, referential, Wettstein, Pragmatic Fallacy

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