Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries
Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries
One of the central claims of Williamson's ground-breaking epistemology is the claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion. This chapter contends that this viewpoint is mistaken. It first explains Williamson's path to the conclusion he holds, identifying the two major arguments that he uses to support his claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion. It summarizes the prima facie case for an alternative view, and then addresses the tension between this prima facie case and Williamson's arguments. The chapter argues that a proper resolution of the conflict results in a denial of the idea that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Instead, to the extent that appropriate assertion is subject to epistemic constraints, those constraints have to do with justification rather than knowledge.
Keywords: justification, knowledge, norm of assertion, defeasibility, Gettier problem
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