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Williamson on Knowledge$
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Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199287512

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001

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Are Mental States Luminous?

Are Mental States Luminous?

(p.217) 13 Are Mental States Luminous?
Williamson on Knowledge

Matthias Steup (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

In Knowledge and its Limits Timothy Williamson gives a fascinating argument against the claim that mental states or conditions are luminous. He defines luminosity as follows: ‘A condition C is luminous if for every case α, if in α C obtains, then in α one is in a position to know that C obtains’. This chapter considers how the luminosity of the mental can be defended against Williamson's argument.

Keywords:   Timothy Williamson, mental states, luminosity, no-awareness-of-change assumption

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