- Title Pages
- <b>Preface</b>
- <b>List of Figures</b>
- <b>List of Tables</b>
- <b>List of Symbols</b>
- 1 <b>How Electoral Systems Matter</b>
- 2 <b>The Origins and Components of Electoral Systems</b>
- 3 Electoral Systems—Simple and Complex
- 4 <b>The Number and Balance of Parties</b>
- 5 <b>Deviation from Proportional Representation and Proportionality Profiles</b>
- 6 <b>Openness to Small Parties: The Micro‐Mega Rule and the Seat Product</b>
- Part II <b>The Duvergerian Macro‐Agenda: How Simple Electoral Systems Affect Party Sizes and Politics</b>
- 7 <b>The Duvergerian Agenda</b>
- 8 <b>The Number of Seat‐Winning Parties and the Largest Seat Share</b>
- 9 <b>Seat Shares of All Parties and the Effective Number of Parties</b>
- 10 <b>The Mean Duration of Cabinets</b>
- 11 <b>How to Simplify Complex Electoral Systems</b>
- 12 <b>Size and Politics</b>
- 13 <b>The Law of Minority Attrition</b>
- 14 <b>The Institutional Impact on Votes and Deviation from PR</b>
- Part III <b>Implications and Broader Agenda</b>
- 15 <b>Thresholds of Representation and the Number of Pertinent Electoral Parties</b>
- 16 <b>Seat Allocation in Federal Second Chambers and the Assemblies of the European Union</b>
- 17 <b>What Can We Expect from Electoral Laws?</b>
- APPENDIX <b>Detecting Factors Other than the Seat Product</b>
- <b>References</b>
- <b>Index</b>
Size and Politics
Size and Politics
- Chapter:
- (p.187) 12 Size and Politics
- Source:
- Predicting Party Sizes
- Author(s):
Rein Taagepera (Contributor Webpage)
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
The cube root law of assembly sizes applies to first or only chambers. It says that assembly size is approximately the cube root of the country's population, because this size minimizes the workload of a representative. This quantitatively predictive logical model agrees with the world averages. Smaller countries have fewer registered parties but more party members per 1,000 population.
Keywords: cube root law, assembly size, minimizing the workload, quantitatively predictive logical model, registered parties, party members
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- Title Pages
- <b>Preface</b>
- <b>List of Figures</b>
- <b>List of Tables</b>
- <b>List of Symbols</b>
- 1 <b>How Electoral Systems Matter</b>
- 2 <b>The Origins and Components of Electoral Systems</b>
- 3 Electoral Systems—Simple and Complex
- 4 <b>The Number and Balance of Parties</b>
- 5 <b>Deviation from Proportional Representation and Proportionality Profiles</b>
- 6 <b>Openness to Small Parties: The Micro‐Mega Rule and the Seat Product</b>
- Part II <b>The Duvergerian Macro‐Agenda: How Simple Electoral Systems Affect Party Sizes and Politics</b>
- 7 <b>The Duvergerian Agenda</b>
- 8 <b>The Number of Seat‐Winning Parties and the Largest Seat Share</b>
- 9 <b>Seat Shares of All Parties and the Effective Number of Parties</b>
- 10 <b>The Mean Duration of Cabinets</b>
- 11 <b>How to Simplify Complex Electoral Systems</b>
- 12 <b>Size and Politics</b>
- 13 <b>The Law of Minority Attrition</b>
- 14 <b>The Institutional Impact on Votes and Deviation from PR</b>
- Part III <b>Implications and Broader Agenda</b>
- 15 <b>Thresholds of Representation and the Number of Pertinent Electoral Parties</b>
- 16 <b>Seat Allocation in Federal Second Chambers and the Assemblies of the European Union</b>
- 17 <b>What Can We Expect from Electoral Laws?</b>
- APPENDIX <b>Detecting Factors Other than the Seat Product</b>
- <b>References</b>
- <b>Index</b>
