- Title Pages
- <b>Preface</b>
- <b>List of Figures</b>
- <b>List of Tables</b>
- <b>List of Symbols</b>
- 1 <b>How Electoral Systems Matter</b>
- 2 <b>The Origins and Components of Electoral Systems</b>
- 3 Electoral Systems—Simple and Complex
- 4 <b>The Number and Balance of Parties</b>
- 5 <b>Deviation from Proportional Representation and Proportionality Profiles</b>
- 6 <b>Openness to Small Parties: The Micro‐Mega Rule and the Seat Product</b>
- Part II <b>The Duvergerian Macro‐Agenda: How Simple Electoral Systems Affect Party Sizes and Politics</b>
- 7 <b>The Duvergerian Agenda</b>
- 8 <b>The Number of Seat‐Winning Parties and the Largest Seat Share</b>
- 9 <b>Seat Shares of All Parties and the Effective Number of Parties</b>
- 10 <b>The Mean Duration of Cabinets</b>
- 11 <b>How to Simplify Complex Electoral Systems</b>
- 12 <b>Size and Politics</b>
- 13 <b>The Law of Minority Attrition</b>
- 14 <b>The Institutional Impact on Votes and Deviation from PR</b>
- Part III <b>Implications and Broader Agenda</b>
- 15 <b>Thresholds of Representation and the Number of Pertinent Electoral Parties</b>
- 16 <b>Seat Allocation in Federal Second Chambers and the Assemblies of the European Union</b>
- 17 <b>What Can We Expect from Electoral Laws?</b>
- APPENDIX <b>Detecting Factors Other than the Seat Product</b>
- <b>References</b>
- <b>Index</b>
The Number of Seat‐Winning Parties and the Largest Seat Share
The Number of Seat‐Winning Parties and the Largest Seat Share
- Chapter:
- (p.115) 8 The Number of Seat‐Winning Parties and the Largest Seat Share
- Source:
- Predicting Party Sizes
- Author(s):
Rein Taagepera (Contributor Webpage)
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
The quantity to watch is the ‘seat product’ — the product of the assembly size and district magnitude. The number of parties represented in the assembly is approximately the fourth root of the seat product. The fractional seat share of the largest party is approximately the inverse of the eighth root of the seat product. This quantitatively predictive logical model agrees with the world averages. The results are approximate, because other factors are present.
Keywords: seat product, assembly size, district magnitude, number of parties, quantitatively predictive logical model
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- Title Pages
- <b>Preface</b>
- <b>List of Figures</b>
- <b>List of Tables</b>
- <b>List of Symbols</b>
- 1 <b>How Electoral Systems Matter</b>
- 2 <b>The Origins and Components of Electoral Systems</b>
- 3 Electoral Systems—Simple and Complex
- 4 <b>The Number and Balance of Parties</b>
- 5 <b>Deviation from Proportional Representation and Proportionality Profiles</b>
- 6 <b>Openness to Small Parties: The Micro‐Mega Rule and the Seat Product</b>
- Part II <b>The Duvergerian Macro‐Agenda: How Simple Electoral Systems Affect Party Sizes and Politics</b>
- 7 <b>The Duvergerian Agenda</b>
- 8 <b>The Number of Seat‐Winning Parties and the Largest Seat Share</b>
- 9 <b>Seat Shares of All Parties and the Effective Number of Parties</b>
- 10 <b>The Mean Duration of Cabinets</b>
- 11 <b>How to Simplify Complex Electoral Systems</b>
- 12 <b>Size and Politics</b>
- 13 <b>The Law of Minority Attrition</b>
- 14 <b>The Institutional Impact on Votes and Deviation from PR</b>
- Part III <b>Implications and Broader Agenda</b>
- 15 <b>Thresholds of Representation and the Number of Pertinent Electoral Parties</b>
- 16 <b>Seat Allocation in Federal Second Chambers and the Assemblies of the European Union</b>
- 17 <b>What Can We Expect from Electoral Laws?</b>
- APPENDIX <b>Detecting Factors Other than the Seat Product</b>
- <b>References</b>
- <b>Index</b>