This chapter looks at just a few of the ways in which a pluralistic view of logical consequence could be developed. It considers the upshot of recognising the plurality of consequence relations; how the plurality can be exploited; and ways that pluralism might be further developed in the theory of proofs. The moral of logical pluralism is that not every consequence relation needs to do everything that must be done by consequence relations. Failure to learn that (pluralistic) moral unnecessarily hinders logical theorising. It is one thing to recognise plurality in the development of a logical system, but something more interesting to let pluralism go somewhere. We can exploit the fact that we have more than one consequence relation, and allow the presence of a number of distinct consequence relations to do some work for us.
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