General Objections
General Objections
By way of further clarifying logical pluralism, this chapter turns to some general objections. One objection is to argue for a pluralism about logical consequence which is wide enough to encompass classical, relevant, and intuitionistic logic. In doing so, this chapter proposes a view which the adherents of relevant and intuitionistic logic by and large would find repugnant. In order to endorse classical logic all instances of the law of the excluded middle should be taken to be necessary. But intuitionists take the law of excluded middle to have counterexamples. The premises of this objection are correct, but the conclusion, that pluralism is uninteresting, should be resisted. Other objections discussed in this chapter relate to cases, transitivity and reflexivity, warrant and entitlement, warrant and disjunctive syllogism, meaning theory, logical truth, Carnapian pluralism, and logical form.
Keywords: logical pluralism, general objections, logical consequence, cases, transitivity, reflexivity, warrant, entitlement, disjunctive syllogism, meaning theory
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