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The Phenomenal Self$
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Barry Dainton

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199288847

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288847.001.0001

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Minds and Mental Integration

Minds and Mental Integration

(p.170) 6 Minds and Mental Integration
The Phenomenal Self

Barry Dainton (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins with a survey of the sorts of states and capacities to be found in typical human minds, focusing on the differing extents to which these have phenomenal aspects or manifestations. Addressing the question: ‘do zombies have minds?’ proves to be a useful way of clarifying this issue. The C-theory is augmented so as to accommodate the non-experiential aspects of mind. Two types of self are distinguished: phenomenal and non-phenomenal. This distinction proves useful when considering the question: ‘what matters in survival?’ It is argued that when psychological and experiential continuities diverge, our deepest identity-related concerns remain locked on to the latter. The same distinction also sheds useful light onto the intuitions evoked by imaginary scenarios featuring teleportation.

Keywords:   mental states, zombies, what matters, mental subjects, psychological continuity, phenomenal selves, non-phenomenal selves, teleportation

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