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Pascal's WagerPragmatic Arguments and Belief in God$
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Jeff Jordan

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199291328

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.001.0001

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An Embarrassment of Riches?

An Embarrassment of Riches?

(p.73) 3 An Embarrassment of Riches?
Pascal's Wager

Jeff Jordan (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The Jamesian Wager has as a premise: the proposition that theistic belief is more rewarding than non-belief in this life, whether or not God exists. This proposition provides the Pascalian a way of circumventing the many-gods objection, which states that the Wager fails because it proves too much. Any number of incompatible religious options can be supported by a wager relevantly like that of Pascal. Three versions of the many-gods objection are examined.

Keywords:   many-gods objection, Kantian gap, Leslie Stephens

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