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New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy$
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Douglas Patterson

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199296309

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296309.001.0001

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Truth, Meaning, and Translation

Truth, Meaning, and Translation

(p.247) 10 Truth, Meaning, and Translation
New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy

Panu Raatikainen

Oxford University Press

The modal objection to Tarski's way of defining truth contends that in defining truth so as to imply the T-sentences, Tarski makes the T-sentences into necessary truths, which they clearly are not. However, a proper understanding of Tarski's conception of a language makes clear that languages are individuated in part by the meanings of their words and hence it is unobjectionable that the T-sentences should express necessary truths. Further issues with this line of response to the modal objection are addressed and issues concerning definitions vs. theories of truth, and the status of semantics as descriptive or stipulative are explored.

Keywords:   Tarski, T-sentences, language

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