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New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy$
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Douglas Patterson

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199296309

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296309.001.0001

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Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth

Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth

(p.133) 6 Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth
New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy

Marian David

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines Tarski's Convention T and argues that as an adequacy condition for a definition of truth it is in some ways peculiarly specific to a given language and metalanguage, while also being treated by Tarski as somehow general. It is suggested that Tarski operates with a kind of contextualist understanding of the term ‘true’, on which though its extension differs for different languages, it always expresses the same concept. This interpretation is compared to more standard readings of Tarski on which he defines a range of language-specific concepts.

Keywords:   Tarski, Convention T, concept of truth

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