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A Virtue EpistemologyApt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199297023

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001

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(p.134) Appendix
A Virtue Epistemology

Ernest Sosa (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

It has been argued powerfully by Alvin Plantinga that naturalism suffers a kind of epistemic self-refutation, for it cannot provide appropriately for the very possibility of its being accepted rationally and known to be true. This argument is explained carefully, and its merits assessed, by reference to the epistemology of apt belief and reflective knowledge.

Keywords:   meta-competence, apt belief, reflective knowledge, epistemology of apt belief

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