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Referential MechanicsDirect Reference and the Foundations of Semantics$
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Joseph Almog

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199314379

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199314379.001.0001

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Direct Reference by Referential Uses

Direct Reference by Referential Uses

Chapter:
(p.61) Chapter 3 Direct Reference by Referential Uses
Source:
Referential Mechanics
Author(s):

Joseph Almog

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199314379.003.0003

Keith Donnellan's notion of “referential use” is explained. This involves analysis of his account of names, definite descriptions, and demonstratives. His methodology is contrasted with Kripke's, who champions a critique of Donnellan's work as belonging to “paragmatics.” It is explained why referential uses are for Donnellan the key to semantic reference; and it is observed that the notion of “having an object in mind” is key to Donnellan's account and that the standard analysis in terms of an inside-out “intention” is misguided. Rather, a perception-like outside-in information-processing account of incoming signals from objects is developed. Donnellan's account is extended to compound phrases and its cognitive psychology orientation is examined.

Keywords:   Donnellan, Kripke, semantics, pragmatics, descriptions, have in mind, referential use

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