Can normative words like ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’ be defined in entirely non-normative terms? This book argues that they can, advancing an end-relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is ordinarily used. Whereas it is widely maintained that relational theories cannot account for the special features of moral and deliberative uses of these words, this book argues that the end-relational theory accommodates these features systematically on the basis of a single fundamental principle of conversational pragmatics. These ... More

Can normative words like ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’ be defined in entirely non-normative terms? This book argues that they can, advancing an end-relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is ordinarily used. Whereas it is widely maintained that relational theories cannot account for the special features of moral and deliberative uses of these words, this book argues that the end-relational theory accommodates these features systematically on the basis of a single fundamental principle of conversational pragmatics. These challenges comprise the central problems of metaethics, including the connection between normative judgment and motivation, the categorical character of morality, the nature of intrinsic value, and the possibility of normative disagreement. This linguistic analysis has far-reaching implications for the metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology of morality, as well as for the nature and possibility of normative ethical theory. Most significantly it supplies a nuanced answer to the ancient Euthyphro Question of whether things are desired because they are judged to be good, or vice versa. Normative speech and thought may ultimately be just a manifestation of our nature as intelligent animals motivated by contingent desires for various conflicting ends.