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Permissible Progeny?The Morality of Procreation and Parenting$
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Sarah Hannan, Samantha Brennan, and Richard Vernon

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199378111

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199378111.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 October 2020

Creation Theory

Creation Theory

Do Genetic Ties Matter?

(p.129) Chapter 5 Creation Theory
Permissible Progeny?

Elizabeth Brake

Oxford University Press

Procreation has costs of a sort that are generally wrong to impose on others. These include costs to the environment and to those waiting to be adopted. Without justification, it appears that procreation is impermissible. A natural thought is that the costs can be justified by the value of the parent-child relationship. However, there are compelling arguments that genetic ties are morally irrelevant to the value of such a relationship, and so cannot justify procreating when adoption is an option. This chapter considers what circumstances would justify procreation. The most plausible justification would likely appeal to reproducing valuable genetically heritable traits of ancestors, partners, or gamete donors. This chapter considers the objections that this justification implies eugenicist rankings and that it rests on uncertain family resemblances.

Keywords:   procreation, environment, adoption, genetics, genes, eugenics, parent, child, relationship

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