Knowing what individuals are and how they can be identified is a question of recurring importance in the history of philosophy. Most contemporary philosophers consider the problem from a general, metaphysical point of view. On the other hand the preferred approach in philosophy of science aims to define the ontological status of this or that individual or class of individuals, typically in the fields of physics and biology. These different approaches issue from deep differences in philosophical methods, especially as they relate to metaphysics; they also reflect differences between fields of s ... More

Knowing what individuals are and how they can be identified is a question of recurring importance in the history of philosophy. Most contemporary philosophers consider the problem from a general, metaphysical point of view. On the other hand the preferred approach in philosophy of science aims to define the ontological status of this or that individual or class of individuals, typically in the fields of physics and biology. These different approaches issue from deep differences in philosophical methods, especially as they relate to metaphysics; they also reflect differences between fields of sciences. The question of individuality is a consummate point of contact between the sciences and metaphysics, providing a means to explore general questions about the relations between philosophy and science. This volume offers a confrontation between metaphysicians, philosophers of physics, and philosophers of biology on the criteria of individuation. This confrontation is not envisaged as a “battlefield” in which each side misunderstands the basic methodology of the other. Progress in the development of a unifying and operative notion of the individual is made only when metaphysicians are informed by today’s sciences, and philosophers of science keep in mind the goal of general metaphysics. The present volume, in other words, aims at clarifying and overcoming the difficulties that hold back the construction of a general conception of the individual that would be adequate for both physics and biology, and perhaps beyond.