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TaintedHow Philosophy of Science Can Expose Bad Science$
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Kristin Shrader-Frechette

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199396412

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199396412.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 October 2020

Value Judgments Can Kill

Value Judgments Can Kill

Expected-Utility Rules in Decision Theory

(p.178) (p.179) Chapter 13 Value Judgments Can Kill

Kristin Shrader-Frechette

Oxford University Press

This chapter outlines different types of scientific value judgments, shows which are unavoidable, especially in situations of scientific uncertainty, and argues that under three distinct circumstances, the evaluative rule of maximizing expected utility is inferior to the maximin rule of avoiding the worst outcome.

Keywords:   decision theory, expected utility, maximin, uncertainty, value judgment

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