This chapter explores how biforcated attitude semantics might be exploited in order to develop nondescriptivist treatments in other philosophical domains. A strategy for applying biforcated attitude semantics to an arbitrary domain is developed, as well as a toy expressivist theory of indicative conditionals. A more sophisticated account of truth is developed, which predicts that ‘P’ and ‘it is true that P’ are equivalent but have different semantic contents, and on which ‘true’ is nondescriptive, corresponding to no property. It is shown, further, how such an account can be exploited to solve expressivist problems about disagreement and validity.
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