This chapter employs the Basic Expressivist Maneuver to show how the negation problem can be solved, by appeal only to A-type inconsistency. To do so, expressivists must give up the idea that normative predicates semantically correspond to primitive attitudes, and allow that all normative sentences express a single attitude, to which different predicates contribute different contents. This attitude is called ‘being for’. Four explanations are offered of the elegance and attractiveness of the resulting account, and it is argued that it is the only way to solve the negation problem by appeal to expressivist-respectable assumptions. A possible objection is addressed.
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