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Being ForEvaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism$
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Mark Schroeder

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199534654

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.001.0001

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Descriptive Language and Belief

Descriptive Language and Belief

(p.89) 7 Descriptive Language and Belief
Being For

Mark Schroeder (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter takes up the project of analyzing ordinary descriptive belief in terms of the attitude of being for. A first-pass account, according to which believing p is being for proceeding as if p, is developed and dismissed on the basis of the new negation problem: negated descriptive sentences don't turn out to express the right beliefs in order to receive the right truth conditions. This is replaced by the proposal that belief is a biforcated attitude, consisting in two states of being for: being for proceeding as if p, and being for not proceeding as if p. It is shown that this treatment glosses the new negation problem up to the notion of commitment-equivalence. Finally, it is argued that the biforcated attitude analysis of belief is not ad hoc and has other interesting applications, particularly in elucidating the concept of disbelief.

Keywords:   proceeding as if, new negation problem, truth conditions, biforcated attitudes, commitment, commitment-equivalence, disbelief

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