Language, Truth, and Inference
Language, Truth, and Inference
This chapter examines externalism rooted in theoretical claims about the content of language-mediated thought, especially by a focus on Davidson's truth-based theory and Brandom's use-based theory. It also considers other form of interpretationism, and many forms of Wittgenstein's private language argument. It develops an internalist response to these various externalist theories and arguments, which involves incorporation of internalist variants of their various externalist mechanisms.
Keywords: Davidson, Brandom, truth, inference, use, private language argument, Wittgenstein, content
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