Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
EmpathyPhilosophical and Psychological Perspectives$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199539956

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539956.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 01 July 2022

Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?

Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?

(p.211) 13 Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?

Jesse J. Prinz

Oxford University Press

In this chapter I ask whether empathy is necessary for morality.  This question can be disambiguated in several ways.  Is empathy necessary for making moral judgments? Is empathy necessary for developing a moral sense?  Is empathy necessary for moral motivation?  Is empathy normatively necessary‐‐i.e., should we necessarily try to cultivate an empathy-based moral psychology? I argue that the answer to each of these questions is no. Empathy is less integral to morality, than some have thought, and potentially an impediment to moral motivation. Other moral emotions are more important.

Keywords:   moral development, motivation, moral judgment, anger, guilt, gender, culture

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .