Rational Actors and Social Citizenship
Rational Actors and Social Citizenship
This chapter examines the arguments about whether social citizenship can be based on an individual rational actor logic or requires a framework of normative principles, embedded in the institutions of social provision and in policy-making. The arguments of Titmuss, Le Grand, and others about blood donorship, social care, and other areas where altruistic and humane rather than self-regarding values appear to be central are considered. Individual rational actor approaches can explain how reciprocity and a limited social inclusion may be sustained, as Chapter 4 showed. Analysis of social psychological, sociological, and economic evidence shows that a full understanding of trust rests on both the alignment of interest that a rational actor logic can explain and also the recognition of values of commitment and care in the trusted person. These are contradicted when action is driven by externally imposed incentives. The trust deficit is a central issue in rational actor reform of social provision.
Keywords: Titmuss, Le Grand, blood, social care, commitment, trust, reciprocity, inclusion, altruism
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