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Kinds of ReasonsAn Essay in the Philosophy of Action$
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Maria Alvarez

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199550005

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550005.001.0001

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(p.7) 1 Reasons
Kinds of Reasons

Maria Alvarez (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The first chapter prepares the ground, and the conceptual tools, for an exploration of reasons in contexts of human agency, by exploring reasons broadly. It examines the normative and explanatory force of reasons. It argues that reasons have normative force in so far as they make acting, wanting, or believing something right or appropriate; and that, in the case of believing, the rightness or appropriateness concerns the concept of truth; while in the case of acting and wanting, it concerns the concepts of what is valuable and of the good, broadly conceived. It then examines the variety of roles that reasons can play and focuses on the justifying, motivating, and explanatory roles of reasons.

Keywords:   reasons, action, normativity, ought, Raz, roles, justification, motivation, explanation

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