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Kinds of ReasonsAn Essay in the Philosophy of Action$
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Maria Alvarez

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199550005

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550005.001.0001

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(p.199) Conclusion
Kinds of Reasons

Maria Alvarez (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The conclusion briefly draws together the main conclusions of the book and places them against the background of the questions that dominated action theory for decades after the publication of Davidson's paper ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, namely, whether reasons are causes and whether reason explanations are causal explanations. It is suggested that the questions have often been debated in terms which are muddled due to the lack of nuance in understanding reasons. It is suggested that it would, therefore, be interesting to reassess the questions Davidson put on the table with a clearer grasp of what our reasons for acting are, and a clearer picture of the reasons that explain action and the variety of forms that explanations of action take.

Keywords:   reasons, actions, reason explanation, Davidson, causal theory

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