Against Substitution: The Constitutional Thinking of Dissensus
Against Substitution: The Constitutional Thinking of Dissensus
This chapter presents an irresolution thesis: that constituent power cannot be absorbed into constituted authority and is to be treated as irreducible supplement which irritates and challenges rather than transcends the specific forms of constituted power. It argues that the radical openness of constituent power depends on its occupying a domain radically independent of constitutional form, and that it is possible to imagine and activate such a domain as something other than the ante-room of constitutional initiative and authority.
Keywords: irresolution, constituent power, dissensus, radical openness
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