- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- §1. Epistemological Disjunctivism: A First Pass
- §2. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism
- §3. Three <i>Prima Facie</i> Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism
- §4. Metaphysical and Epistemological Disjunctivism
- §5. Seeing That <i>P</i> and Knowing That <i>P</i>
- §6. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction
- §7. Resolving the Access Problem
- Introductory Remarks
- §1. The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge
- §2. Relevant Alternatives and Closure
- §3. Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission, and Favouring
- §4. Favouring and Discriminating Epistemic Support
- §5. Diagnosis
- §6. A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory
- §7. Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support and Epistemological Disjunctivism
- Introductory Remarks
- §1. Radical Scepticism
- §2. Mooreanism
- §3. Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism
- §4. A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism
- §5. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism
- §6. Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies
- §7. Radical Scepticism and Quietism
- §8. Knowing and Saying That One Knows
- §9. Concluding Remarks
- References
- Index
Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission, and Favouring
Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission, and Favouring
- Chapter:
- (p.73) §3. Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission, and Favouring
- Source:
- Epistemological Disjunctivism
- Author(s):
Duncan Pritchard
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter suggests that if we wish to retain the closure principle, then there is a burden upon us to explain what this knowledge of the entailed proposition is in virtue of, and that means that we both need to account for the failure of the discrimination principle whilst also responding to this evidential challenge posed by the evidential transmission and favouring principles. The key to resolving both these problems is to recognize that Zula's evidential position is in fact much stronger than we ordinarily tend to think, and certainly strong enough to satisfy the requirements laid down by the evidential transmission and favouring principles.
Keywords: closure principle, discrimination principle, favouring principles, evidential transmission, Zula
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- §1. Epistemological Disjunctivism: A First Pass
- §2. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism
- §3. Three <i>Prima Facie</i> Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism
- §4. Metaphysical and Epistemological Disjunctivism
- §5. Seeing That <i>P</i> and Knowing That <i>P</i>
- §6. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction
- §7. Resolving the Access Problem
- Introductory Remarks
- §1. The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge
- §2. Relevant Alternatives and Closure
- §3. Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission, and Favouring
- §4. Favouring and Discriminating Epistemic Support
- §5. Diagnosis
- §6. A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory
- §7. Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support and Epistemological Disjunctivism
- Introductory Remarks
- §1. Radical Scepticism
- §2. Mooreanism
- §3. Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism
- §4. A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism
- §5. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism
- §6. Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies
- §7. Radical Scepticism and Quietism
- §8. Knowing and Saying That One Knows
- §9. Concluding Remarks
- References
- Index
