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Epistemological Disjunctivism$
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Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199557912

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001

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Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies

Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies

Chapter:
(p.131) §6. Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies
Source:
Epistemological Disjunctivism
Author(s):

Duncan Pritchard

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0023

This chapter presents the radical sceptical paradox, at least insofar as it made use of the BIV sceptical hypothesis: BIV-Based Radical Scepticism qua Paradox — (BIV1) I don't know that I'm not a BIV. (BIV2) If I know that I have two hands, then I know that I'm not a BIV. (BIV3) I do know that I have two hands. It is shown that epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism represents an undercutting anti-sceptical strategy, and as such it is in a position to offer an intellectually satisfying response to the radical sceptical paradox. Indeed, if the epistemological disjunctivist is right that this putative paradox is actually at root motivated by faulty philosophical theory rather than by intuition, then the net effect of this anti-sceptical strategy is that radical scepticism is not the paradox that it claims to be. As such, this anti-sceptical proposal is much better placed to deal with the sceptical problem than its epistemic externalist neo-Moorean rival, who is committed to offering a dialectically weaker overriding anti-sceptical strategy.

Keywords:   radical sceptical paradox, intuitive claim, anti-sceptical proposals, epistemological disjunctivism, neo-Mooreanism

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