This chapter summarizes the discussions in Part 3 of the book. It has been shown that epistemological disjunctivism can be successfully applied to the problem of radical scepticism, at least provided one embeds the view within some key wider claims. The anti-sceptical position that results is a form of neo-Mooreanism, albeit one that has important advantages over other neo-Moorean views that are cast along epistemic externalist or standard epistemic internalist lines. A crucial move in arguing for this position was to show that radical sceptical challenges are by their nature unmotivated, where this has a significant effect on the dialectical obligations incurred by the antisceptic. In particular, this means that the epistemological disjunctivist neo-Moorean is spared the impossible task of trying to demonstrate that agents have an independent reflectively accessible rational basis for excluding radical sceptical hypotheses. As a result, the path is cleared for this proposal to show how our knowledge of the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses could be supported by reflectively accessible factive reasons.
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