Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Epistemological Disjunctivism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199557912

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 14 June 2021

Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism

Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism

(p.17) §2. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism
Epistemological Disjunctivism

Duncan Pritchard

Oxford University Press

This chapter suggests that the reason why epistemological disjunctivism is not widely adopted is because it is held to face several fatal theoretical problems. Accordingly, whatever commonsense support it might have, it is thought to be a complete non-starter as a theoretical position. Epistemological disjunctivism is motivated by showing that this is an attractive position which we would want to hold if it were theoretically available, and further showing that it is theoretically available, contrary to the prevailing conventional wisdom in epistemology.

Keywords:   epistemological disjunctivism, theoretical availability, epistemology

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .