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Epistemological Disjunctivism$
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Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199557912

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 June 2021

Seeing That P and Knowing That P

Seeing That P and Knowing That P

Chapter:
(p.25) §5. Seeing That P and Knowing That P
Source:
Epistemological Disjunctivism
Author(s):

Duncan Pritchard

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0006

This chapter argues that epistemological disjunctivism can evade the basis problem by resisting the conventional wisdom embodied by the entailment thesis. In particular, it maintains that one can capture the close connections between seeing that p and knowing that p without having to endorse the entailment thesis. It then further motivates the proposed alternative view by showing how this view can be embedded within a more sophisticated account of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases than that which is suggested by the entailment thesis. It is thus shown how rejecting the entailment thesis is a viable theoretical option for the proponent of epistemological disjunctivism. Hence, insofar as epistemological disjunctivism really does have the extensive theoretical advantages that it is said to have, then there is a solid theoretical basis to reject the entailment thesis and endorse in its place the alternative account of the relationship between seeing that p and knowing that p is offered.

Keywords:   epistemological disjunctivism, entailment thesis, seeing, knowing

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