Well-Being and Death
Ben Bradley
Abstract
This book addresses philosophical questions about death and well‐being. It defends two main theses. The first is hedonism, or the view that pleasure is what has intrinsic value for us. The second is a difference‐making principle about value, according to which (i) the value of an event for a person is determined by the difference it makes to the intrinsic value of that person's life, and (ii) the value of an event for someone at a time is determined by the difference it makes to how well‐off the person is at that time. These views have the following implications: things that happen after someo ... More
This book addresses philosophical questions about death and well‐being. It defends two main theses. The first is hedonism, or the view that pleasure is what has intrinsic value for us. The second is a difference‐making principle about value, according to which (i) the value of an event for a person is determined by the difference it makes to the intrinsic value of that person's life, and (ii) the value of an event for someone at a time is determined by the difference it makes to how well‐off the person is at that time. These views have the following implications: things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; death itself, however, is bad for people after they die (contrary to what Epicurus thought), by making its victim worse off at those later times; death is worse the earlier it occurs, so it is worse to die as an infant than as a young adult; death is bad for fetuses and animals in essentially the same way as it is for adult humans; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more of a good life is possible.
Keywords:
death,
well‐being,
intrinsic value,
hedonism,
difference‐making,
Epicurus,
time
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 2009 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780199557967 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009 |
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.001.1 |
