Generalizing to Other Forms of Consequentialism
Generalizing to Other Forms of Consequentialism
This chapter lays out several variants upon standard act consequentialism, including indirect act consequentialism, rule consequentialism, evaluator-relative consequentialism, and non-foundational consequentialism. It is argued that the arguments against standard act consequentialism developed in previous chapters extend to these other forms of consequentialism as well. A distinctive set of challenges is posed by non-foundational variants, which take the ultimate foundations for consequentialist normative moral principles to be supplied by something other than impersonal value. It is shown in Section 8.5 that the arguments provided in earlier chapters generate a presumption against the success of any such non-foundational arguments for consequentialism. These general arguments are then applied to specific versions of non-foundational consequentialism that have been developed by Brad Hooker, David Cummiskey, and Derek Parfit.
Keywords: indirect consequentialism, evaluator-relative consequentialism, rule consequentialism, non-foundational consequentialism, Hooker, Parfit, Cummiskey
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