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Cuts and CloudsVagueness, its Nature, & its Logic$
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Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199570386

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001

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Saying More (or Less) Than One Thing

Saying More (or Less) Than One Thing

(p.289) 16 Saying More (or Less) Than One Thing
Cuts and Clouds

Andrea Iacona

Oxford University Press

This chapter is based on the idea that there is an important sense in which the things we say may involve a degree of specificity that goes beyond what we have in mind when we say them. In that sense, the things we say are interpretations of the sentences we use that are sufficiently specific for the purpose of ascribing truth or falsity to those sentences. This chapter explains how the relation between logic and natural language can be elucidated on the basis of this idea, and shows how some fundamental issues concerning vagueness can be handled accordingly.

Keywords:   validity, precisifications, interpretation, underspecification, specificity

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