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AssertionNew Philosophical Essays$
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Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199573004

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001

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Assertion and Isolated Second‐Hand Knowledge *

Assertion and Isolated Second‐Hand Knowledge *

(p.251) 11 Assertion and Isolated Second‐Hand Knowledge*

Jennifer Lackey (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

A common view in the recent philosophical literature is that knowledge is sufficient for proper assertion. More precisely, it is frequently said that one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. This chapter argues that this thesis is false. In particular, it is shown that there are various kinds of cases in which a speaker asserts that p, clearly knows that p, and yet does not have the proper epistemic authority or credentials to make such an assertion, thereby showing that knowledge is not always sufficient for epistemically proper assertion. A diagnosis is then offered of what is salient in the cases challenging this sufficiency claim and a broad feature is highlighted that needs to be accounted for in any view of the norm governing proper assertion.

Keywords:   assertion, knowledge, second-hand knowledge, sufficiency, quantity of epistemic support, epistemic authority

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