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Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and RealismEssays on Wilfrid Sellars$
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Willem A. deVries

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199573301

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.001.0001

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Some Sellarsian Myths

Some Sellarsian Myths

Chapter:
(p.101) 4 Some Sellarsian Myths
Source:
Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism
Author(s):

Paul Snowdon (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.003.0005

This chapter locates Sellars's discussion of perception in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ within the context of his discussion of the myth of the given. It argues that his criticisms of the traditional sense datum theory are insightful but in some respects indecisive. It is further argued that Sellars's account of our thought about perception contains important insights in his treatment of looks-judgments, but that he mis-describes in a fundamental way our understanding of such talk, and that more mistakes creep into his account when he links our thought about perception to the second myth of Jones.

Keywords:   perception, sense datum, looks-judgments, myth of Jones, Wilfrid Sellars

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