Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Social Epistemology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199577477

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 January 2021

The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist

The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist

(p.89) 5 The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist
Social Epistemology

Jonathan Kvanvig (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The Swamping Problem is one of the central problems in the new value-driven approach to epistemology that has arisen recently. It arises from the fact that value isn't always additive, so if you begin with something valuable (true belief) and add a further valuable thing (justification), there is no guarantee that the combination is more valuable. The usual target of such concerns is reliabilism, but such concerns plague approaches that are more conscious of value concerns as well, such as functional accounts that aim at an account of knowledge in terms of its social significance as a marker of dependable sources of information. Here this chapter investigates the fundamental nature of the problem and several recent attempts to provide an escape route from the problem, concluding that none of them succeed.

Keywords:   justified belief, reliabilism, social significance of knowledge, swamping problem

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .