Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Cognitive Phenomenology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579938

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 January 2022

On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia

On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia

(p.215) On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia
Cognitive Phenomenology

Christopher Shields

Oxford University Press

Philosophers of mind have shown a marked reluctance to countenance cognitive qualia; they deny the existence of mental states which are both intentional and available to phenomenal consciousness. This reluctance is surprising: if we think that being curious as to whether p is true qualifies as a single mental state, as we should, then on the assumption that curiosity has a distinctive phenomenology, as it seems to have, then we should need a special reason for thinking that there are no states—that there cannot be states—appropriately regarded as exhibiting cognitive qualia. Needless to say, eliminativists about qualia in general will be unimpressed with the putatively qualitative character of such states. In this, they are wholly consistent and also wholly extreme. Still, they occupy a perfectly stable position. By contrast, those philosophers, the vast majority, who countenance at least some qualia, for perceptual and emotional states, do not enjoy the stability purchased by extremity. They are thus liable to a series of parity arguments which establish that any reason we might have for countenancing non‐cognitive qualia equally counts as a reason for countenancing cognitive qualia.

Keywords:   qualia, curiosity, propositional attitudes, willing, eliminativism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .