Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Cognitive Phenomenology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579938

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 January 2022

On the Phenomenology of Thought

On the Phenomenology of Thought

Chapter:
(p.103) On the Phenomenology of Thought
Source:
Cognitive Phenomenology
Author(s):

Joseph Levine

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0005

This paper distinguishes weaker and stronger versions of CP (the Cognitive Phenomenology Hypothesis) along two dimensions: first, whether cognition contributes to phenomenal character only by way of modifying sensory phenomenal character, or it creates a purely non‐sensory kind of phenomenal character (“impure CP” vs. “pure CP,” respectively); second, whether cognitive phenomenal character has what I call “opaque content” or “transparent content” (“CPOC” vs. “CPTC,” respectively). The first member of each distinction is the weaker one. The paper then explores the arguments for there being any sort of cognitive phenomenology to see which of these versions are supported. The paper tentatively concludes that the weakest version, impure CPOC, is the most one can get out of these arguments.

Keywords:   consciousness, phenomenal character, subjectivity, self‐knowledge, phenomenology

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .