Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Spectres of False DivinityHume's Moral Atheism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Thomas Holden

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579945

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579945.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 January 2021

Mitigated Skepticism and Hume's Liminal Natural Theology

Mitigated Skepticism and Hume's Liminal Natural Theology

(p.19) 2 Mitigated Skepticism and Hume's Liminal Natural Theology
Spectres of False Divinity

Thomas Holden (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter defends the interpretation of Hume as a moral atheist against the objection that Hume's own mitigated scepticism rules out such dogmatic commitments in natural theology. According to this objection, Hume could be a moral agnostic, perhaps, but not a moral atheist. In response it is argued, by way of a series of examples taken from Hume's texts, that his scepticism does not in fact rule out all speculation about the deity. Since these examples include, inter alia, each of Hume's arguments for moral atheism, the chapter also provides a preview of his overall case for establishing divine amorality.

Keywords:   Hume, mitigated scepticism, moral agnosticism, moral atheism, natural theology, scepticism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .